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Organizing life according to differences, be they sexual
(male/female)1 or otherwise,2 is a social praxis. Indeed, feminists
have long argued that though it may be possible to group humans into
two groups based on differences which we call sexual, the meaning
we ascribe to these differences and the impact we allow them to
have is unequivocally social. In other words, what we make of these
differences and the psychological and material consequences they
1 It has been suggested that I may mean ‘gendered’ here. Though I personally believe,
with Anne Fausto-Sterling (Sexing the Body: Gender Politics and the Construction of
Sexuality, rev. edn (New York: Basic Books, 2000)), Thomas Laqueur (Making Sex:
Body and Gender from the Greeks to Freud (Cambridge,MA:Harvard University Press,
2003)), and others, that sex is a scientific construct, using ‘gender’ here would be
misleading becausewhat I am referring to are the perceived physical differences not the
social roles extrapolated from the same. Whether these differences are really relevant
for deducing any personality or group traits or whether they have been exacerbated (or
even constructed) by the superimposed (cultural) bicategorization are a different set
of questions (to which I answer: no and yes.)
2 Though other differences, such as ‘racial’ differences, those pertaining to neuronal
or bodily ability, sexual orientation, or those of socio-economic circumstances, have
been of equal importance in this social organization of difference, I focus on gender
difference here because the epistemologists I study base their theoretical framework
on the construction of this specific difference.
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result in arise from socio-cultural interactions, alliances — whether
explicit or not — and more or less fixed arrangements. Second,
feminists have argued that such practices enable the emergence of
two different cultures (men/women)(gender),3 which, through some
combination of feedback loops and confirmation biases, reinforce the
significance and importance given to the alleged sexual differences.
That is, by rewarding members of an in-group for a certain set of
behaviours and punishing or discouraging other behaviours, as well
as ascribing the converse undesirable behaviours to the out-group,
each culture participates in exacerbating and amplifying intergroup
differences.
This dynamic reinforcement of differences has important con-
sequences for epistemology. Indeed, many epistemologists argue that
knowledge production is a specifically human endeavour which is
inextricable from its historical, local, and social context. As a result, ac-
cording to this viewpoint, knowledge is permeable to cultural or group
biases. Feminist epistemologists combined these two insights — the
existence of gendered cultures and the permeability of knowledge to
culture — and began to ask in the 1970s whether, and if so, how,
male cultural (androcentric) biases have impacted the production of
scientific knowledge. In other words, if we accept that the way gender
3 When I use men or women, I mean the cultural extrapolations from the bodily
characteristics (when I mean those, I use male/female). Nicole Claude Mathieu has
suggested that there are three paradigms to think of the relationship between sex and
gender. In the first, social sex (gender) is undissociated from biological sex (sex).
Under this paradigm, all that we associate with the feminine (gender) is a direct and
faithful translation of the (female) biological condition and can only be explained
by it (Nicole-Claude Mathieu, L’Anatomie politique: catégorisations et idéologies du
sexe (Paris: Côté-femmes: 1991)). The second paradigm proposes that the social sex
symbolizes the biological sex.That is to say, that the first (gender) refers to the second
(sex) and is related to it in some way, without being absolutely determined by it.
In this paradigm, if biology is not the only determinant of (gendered) behaviour, it
is because there is, according to these theories, a number of codes and norms that
are learned by individuals, voluntarily or not. The third conceptualization proposes
that the obstinacy to confine the heterogeneity of the biological condition to two
categories actually comes from the social systemwhich frames or orients the reading of
biological data. This conceptualization proposes that the network of norms and codes
that governs bodies and pushes them to conform to one of the two groups has the
purpose of simplifying social interactions. Because of this simplification, the social
model of bicategorization is preferred tomore complexmodels, such as those in which
heterogeneity of sexwould be accepted. As a result, the data invalidating the dimorphic
model are either ignored or reinterpreted in favour of the coherence of the system.
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and gender roles are expressed at any given time is a social praxis,
and we also accept that knowledge emerges out of a specific cultural
context, then the praxis of gender has to be taken into account as part
of the general social context from which this knowledge emerges.
This chapter relies upon my own typology of the strategies put
forward byU.S. feminists in response to the problem of androcentrism
in the production of knowledge. Briefly put, this typology groups the
various feminist strategies into three categories: ‘changing the subject’,
‘multiplying the subject’, and ‘decentring the subject’.4
This chapter has two goals. The first is to challenge the category
of strategies Helen Longino, in ‘Subjects, Power, and Knowledge’,
ascribes to biologist and epistemologist Evelyn Fox Keller and her
strategy: psychodynamism of individuation.5 The second goal of this
chapter is to underline how psychodynamism of individuation and
New Materialism can benefit one another, emphasizing the interrela-
tions between them and discussing their relationship to Spinozist
materialism.
In her 1993 essay, Longino places Keller in the category she calls
— and which I use with some adjustments — ‘changing the subject’.
According to Longino, this category contains two different strategies:
Keller’s psychodynamism of individuation and standpoint theory.6
Longino groups these two strategies together because she believes that
they have similar consequences for rethinking how science should be
done.That is, in her opinion they both attempt to change who is doing
science (what we could call the epistemic subject). Contra Longino,
4 The first two categories are inspired by Helen E. Longino, ‘Subjects, Power, and
Knowledge: Description and Prescription in Feminist Philosophies of Science’, in
Feminist Epistemologies, ed. and intro. by LindaAlcoff andElizabeth Potter (NewYork:
Routledge, 1993), pp. 101–20. The last category is my own.
5 Ibid.
6 Very briefly, ‘standpoint theory’, the genealogy of which can be traced back toMarxism
andBlack feminism, argues that the subject of knowledge’s position (be it their gender,
‘race’, socio-economic background, sexual orientation, mental and physical ability,
etc.) has an influenceon the type andquality of knowledgeproduced.Hence, epistemic
authority is given to certain people on specific topics. For example, it will be assumed
a black woman has access to specific knowledge about the condition of black women
in general, something that cannot be spontaneously known to someone who is not
part of this group (see Patricia Hill Collins, ‘Learning from the Outsider Within: The
Sociological Significance of Black Feminist Thought’, Social Problems, 33.6 (1986),
pp. 14–32). This is not strictly speaking an epistemology based on identity since this
position can change during one’s lifetime.
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I argue that Keller’s use of object-relation theory allows ontological
insights and consequences that are irreducible to a change of the epi-
stemic subject of the sort proposed by standpoint theory. Instead, I
propose that Keller forgoes substantial ontology in favour of relational
ontology. To help make this point, I place Keller’s psychodynamism
of individuation in relation with New Materialism, a strategy found in
my third category (decentring the subject) where I also place Keller’s
psychodynamism of individuation.
This discussion sets the stage for the second goal of this chapter
which is to underline how both strategies (New Materialism and psy-
chodynamism of individuation) can benefit one another. Particularly,
I endeavour to show how Keller’s psychodynamism of individuation
can help address some of the most devastating criticisms directed at
New Materialism. These criticisms are twofold. First, some have con-
tended that the ontology in New Materialism revives the threat of
idealism (understood as anti-realism) because the subject of know-
ledge is also part of the apparatus and hence can impact the phenom-
ena solely through its presence.7 Second, others have reproached the
ontology of New Materialism for making collective action difficult,
and even impossible, given the éclatement of the (human) subject.8
Indeed, in this multiverse of forces, ascribing responsibility can seem
difficult. I shall address these criticisms at the end of this paper.
In brief, this paper aims to encourage reflection on an epistemo-
logical project that takes both psychic structures and matter seriously
by achieving a cross-pollinationofNewMaterialismand thepsychody-
namism of individuation.My hope is that this cohabitation can lead to
more democratic epistemologies. Before going into the details of this
cross-pollination, however, I will first situate myself in the materialist
tradition, for it would be remiss of me not to mention the impact
of Baruch Spinoza on this project. I have borrowed many ideas from
Spinoza but principally his monism and immanent causality. Both
7 Andreas Malm, The Progress of This Storm: Nature and Society in a Warming World
(London: Verso, 2018); Andreas Malm, ‘Against Hybridism: Why We Need to Dis-
tinguish between Nature and Society, Now More than Ever’, Historical Materialism,
27.2 (2019), pp. 156–87.
8 Malm, ‘Against Hybridism’; Eva Bendix Petersen, ‘“Data Found Us”: A Critique of
Some New Materialist Tropes in Educational Research’, Research in Education, 101.1
(2018), pp. 5–16.
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concepts, in my opinion, are remedies to the impasses of teleological
thinking, which is the source of most biases or ‘ideologies’ in Louis
Althusser’s sense.
MATERIALISM
I understand being a materialist in the sense of being a dedicated
monist.Thismonism is inspired by Spinoza’s monism in that it is com-
mitted to using the same methodology when considering the causal
relationships of the attribute of Thought as much as that of Extension.
Indeed, in the Ethics, Spinoza writes:
I shall treat the nature and powers of the Affects, and the
power of the Mind over them, by the same Method by which,
in the preceding parts, I treated God and the Mind, and I
shall consider human actions and appetites just as if it were a
Question of lines, planes, and bodies.9
As such, this methodology means committing to monism even when
it seems not to correspond to traditional notions of materialism: i.e.,
when thinking about social relations as well as psychological forces
and states. Arguing for the contrary — that social relations or psycho-
logical states have no impact on a phenomenon — is, in my view, to
take a dualist stance and claim that psychic and social formations are
somehow supra material.
This monism is also, in my opinion, what connects onto-
epistemological materialism, or scientificmaterialism,10 and historical
materialism, both of which are encountered in this volume.The first is
a materialism which can be traced back to Democritus and Epicurus
and which we associate with a scientific kind of understanding.
According to this type of materialism (and monism), matter is
the only thing that exists. This school of thought is also known as
9 Spinoza, Ethics iii, Praef.;CWS [TheCollectedWorks of Spinoza, see abbreviations], i,
p. 492.
10 The use of ‘scientific’ here may lead to some confusion as Marx has been known to use
the term ‘scientific socialism’ or ‘communism’ to refer to his ideas in opposition to the
‘utopian socialism’ of the kind proposed by Fourier and Saint-Simon (see Raymond
Aron, Le Marxisme de Marx (Paris: Editions de Fallois, 2002), p. 579.). I shall use
scientific here only to refer to the contemporary sense of ‘natural sciences’.
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physicalism. Hence, there is no god-like or soul-like force11 that
can make matter bend the rules of its nature. The second, historical
materialism, is a materialism which can be traced back to Marx and
hasmore to dowith a socio-history which encourages us to learnmore
about social determinations in order to enact socio-political change.
In this sense, I understand Marx’s methodology as monist since social
relations are analysed on the same plane as natural phenomena.12
It is a more complex monism than physicalism, but a monism in its
methodology nonetheless.13
This ‘taking into account’ of social relations and psychological
states as elements that constitute a phenomenon, however, has often
been reduced to radical constructivism or dismissed as such by the
first kind of materialism (onto-epistemological).14 Such a dismissal
seems to suggest that takingmore ‘data’ into accountwhen considering
a phenomenon is alien to science or the scientific method when, in
fact, the contrary should be true. In my opinion, this suggestion is
the result of some confusion around the ideas of contingency and
necessity. Indeed, to say that psychic and social formationsmay impact
matter and vice versa is understood as suggesting that ‘things’, meaning
matter, could have been different (say, if we hadn’t interfered). That
is, it is understood as saying that ‘things’ (or even laws of nature)
are contingent because it seems that if social and psychic formations
11 Though someNewMaterialists use the terms ‘vitality’ and ‘material vitalism’ (e.g. Jane
Bennett), they make a point of distancing themselves from older forms of vitalism
(which are closer to the idea of a soul). Bennett writes ‘Mine is not a vitalism in the
traditional sense; I equate affect with materiality, rather than posit a separate force
that can enter and animate a physical body’ ( Jane Bennett, Vibrant Matter: A Political
Ecology of Things (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2010), p. xiii). So my point
here is that the traditional form of vitalism is an error that leads to a dualist and
teleologistic mode of thinking (though this is might not be the case with the new uses
of ‘vitality’ and ‘vitalism’).
12 Marlon Miguel has correctly pointed out that not all scholars of Marx would agree
with the presentation of his philosophy as monist. While it is true that the question
of monism in Marx is complex, I believe his methodology is more straightforwardly
monist. Žižek has argued, for example, that it is a dialectical monism (see citation
below).
13 Slavoj Žižek, Absolute Recoil: Towards a New Foundation of Dialectical Materialism
(London: Verso: 2014), pp. 5–15.
14 Donna J. Haraway, ‘Situated Knowledges: The Science Question in Feminism and




have anything to do with matter, then the latter might be changed
at will. As a consequence, this supposed contingency of matter is
understood as a kind of anti-realism, in the sense that it seems to
suggest that some external (human or god-like) will has more bearing
on the waymatter behaves than any intrinsic laws of its nature.This is a
misunderstanding. Spinoza, through his rejection of the very notions
of Beginning and End,15 shows that social and psychic formations are
no more free than gravity is. He writes in a Letter 58:
[C]onceive now, if you will, that while the stone continues to
move, it thinks, and knows that as far as it can, it strives to
continue moving. Of course, since the stone is conscious only
of its striving, and not at all indifferent, it will believe that it is
very free, and that it perseveres in motion for no other cause
than because it wills to. This is that famous human freedom
everyone brags of having, which consists only in this: that men
are conscious of their appetite and ignorant of the causes by
which they are determined.16
Indeed, Spinoza’s ontology alerts us to this misconception and pro-
poses ways out of it.17 First, his notion of a unique and immanent
substance throws off the finalist-bias. Second, he shows that the Scho-
lastic notions of necessity and contingency are errors of the same kind:
the result of finitemodes investing a teleological quality intoNature.18
It is this teleological investment, which Spinoza understands as ima-
ginary, that makes us both conceive of a will (ours or God’s) that
15 Louis Althusser saw this in Spinoza as well as a long tradition of materialist thinkers.
He writes in ‘The Underground Current of the Materialism of the Encounter’, in
Philosophy of the Encounter: Later Writings, 1978–87, ed. by François Matheron and
Oliver Corpet, trans. by Geoffrey M. Goshgarian (London: Verso, 2006), pp. 163–
207: ‘from Epicurus to Marx [via Spinoza], there had always subsisted — even if it
was covered over (by its very discovery, by forgetfulness, and, especially, by denial
and repression, when it was not condemnations that cost some their lives) — the
“discovery” of a profound tradition that sought itsmaterialist anchorage in a philosophy
of the encounter (and therefore in a more or less atomistic philosophy, the atom, in
its “fall”, being the simplest figure of individuality). Whence this tradition’s radical
rejection of all philosophies of essence (Ousia, Essentia, Wesen), that is, of Reason
(Logos, Ratio, Vernunft), and therefore of Origin and End’ (p. 188; emphasis in the
original).
16 Ep. lviii [G. H. Schuller]; CWS ii, p. 428.
17 For more on his ontology and the consequences on the notions of Freedom and
Necessity, see Stefano Visentin in this volume.
18 See Ericka Itozaku’s paper in this volume for a more in-depth discussion of this issue.
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shapes things intowhat itwants and also imagines things as contingent.
However, Spinoza shows that the laws underlying the nature of finite
things depend upon other finite modes that constitute and limit it.
Once we get rid of this teleological illusion, the epistemological
and ethical tasks before us become, in Spinozist terms, to sit with and
consider our power in its finitude, i.e., in how it is limited by other fi-
nite modes. Consequently, my argument is that what has beenmissing
from the materialist projects (both onto-epistemological materialism
and scientific materialism) is this understanding of our finitude, and
consequently Spinoza’s ethical project.This finitude, however, is not to
be understood as a kind of fatalism, as pointed out in the introduction
to this volume. Instead, understanding what has determined our lives
is the very thing that sets us free from depleting affects (shame, guilt,
anger, etc.), allowing us to persevere in our being more joyously, i.e.,
powerfully, and, in sodoing, changehowwe relate toother finite beings
and our environment. Freedom is, as Engels would later write, the ap-
preciation of necessity.19 Hence, this change should not be conceived
as a freely made decision that can direct the will here or there; instead,
it is more like a fine tuning of our response to the finite beings that
constitute us and which we constitute in return, and this results in a
better agreement with ourselves and those around us (be they human
or otherwise). This co-constitution of finite things and the fine tuning
to what surrounds us is something we also find in the strategy of New
Materialism, which I will now discuss.
19 Friedrich Engels,Anti-Dühring, inMECW [Marx & Engels CollectedWorks, see abbre-




Though many scholars have written on this topic,20 I will focus here
on Karen Barad’s account of NewMaterialism. Barad’s method, which
she calls the Diffractive Method, is also a metaphor that was inspired
by Haraway and quantum physics. It is used as a critical response
to representationalist metaphors of reflection. Haraway writes about
suchmetaphors, saying that ‘both are optical phenomena, but whereas
reflection evokes themes of mirroring and sameness, diffraction is
marked by patterns of difference’.21 She adds that ‘a diffraction pattern
does not map where differences appear, but rather maps where the
effects of differences appear’.22 Thismethod, therefore, allegedly helps
us to better attend to the relational nature of difference.
Using diffraction as a metaphor can help change the way that we
perceive and interpret objects in two important ways. First, it helps
shift the focus away from the intrinsic characteristics of ‘objects’. That
is,we can see thatwhat is expressed andhencemeasured, i.e. thatwhich
emerges as the ‘characteristics of the waves’, actually emerges from the
meetings of a ‘prior’ set ofwaves. Because anymeasured ‘crest’ does not
actually exist before its meeting with the other crest, and/or the meet-
ing with the diffracting apparatus — e.g. an island or a rock — Barad
calls this meeting an intra-action in contrast to an inter-action. The
20 Rick Dolphijn and Iris van der Tuin, New Materialism: Interviews & Cartographies
(AnnArbor,MI:OpenHumanities Press, 2012); Birgit Van Puymbroeck andN.Kath-
erineHayles, ‘“EnwebbedComplexities”:ThePosthumanities, DigitalMedia andNew
Feminist Materialism’, DiGeSt: Journal of Diversity and Gender Studies, 2.1–2 (2015),
pp. 21–29; Bennett,VibrantMatter;DianaCoole and SamanthaFrost, ‘Introducing the
New Materialisms’, in New Materialisms: Ontology, Agency, and Politics, ed. by Diana
Coole and Samantha Frost (Duke University Press, 2010), pp. 1–43; Rosi Braidotti,
Metamorphoses: Towards a Materialist Theory of Becoming (Oxford : Blackwell, 2002);
Elizabeth A. Grosz, The Nick of Time: Politics, Evolution, and the Untimely (Durham,
NC: Duke University Press, 2004); Elizabeth A. Grosz, Volatile Bodies: Toward a Cor-
poreal Feminism (Bloomington: IndianaUniversity Press, 1994);MariamFraser, Sarah
Kember, and Celia Lury, ‘Inventive Life: Approaches to the New Vitalism’, Theory,
Culture & Society, 22.1 (2005), pp. 1–14.
21 Barad,Meeting the Universe Halfway: Quantum Physics and the Entanglement of Matter
and Meaning (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2007), p. 71.
22 Donna Haraway, ‘The Promises of Monsters: A Regenerative Politics for Inappropri-
ate/d Others’, in Cultural Studies, ed. by Lawrence Grossberg, Cary Nelson, and Paula
A. Treichler (New York: Routledge, 1992), pp. 295–337 (p. 300), emphasis removed.
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nuance is important because inter-action presupposes the existence of
some fully formed ‘actants’ present ‘before themeeting’, whereas intra-
action stresses the co-constitution of those ‘actants’. This move from
inter-action to intra-action therefore requires one to shift ‘the primary
epistemological unit’ from ‘things’ to phenomena, i.e. from an inter-
action between pre-existing relata to boundary forming intra-action
in phenomena. Shifting our analysis from ‘things’ to ‘phenomena’ also
underlines the inseparability of ‘intra-acting’ ‘components’. 23
Second, diffraction is a helpful metaphor because it is, especially
in the case of light, hard to observe without some special apparatus.
Indeed,without the use of a certain set of tools, itmayhave always been
assumed that light only behaved in a particle-like way, i.e. asmatter and
not as waves. Two things happen with this metaphor. First, it emphas-
izes humans’ (in)capacity to detect, observe, or fully grasp something
without a special set of tools and techniques. Second, it emphasizes
the active dynamic role humans take, with or without apparatuses, in
‘(re)configurings of the world’.24 Therefore, the metaphor is not only
helpful to transition from an ontology of ‘objects’ towards one of ‘phe-
nomena’, but it is also useful to understandhow specific practices shape
‘where the effects of differences appear’.25 Themethod/metaphor thus
helps us understand how our very measuring practices are neither in-
nocent nor inconsequential.
However, this insight confronts us — perhaps ironically — with
some problems reminiscent of those faced by an ‘anti-realist’ or even
radical relativist perspective. Indeed, if everythingwe do, down to how
we perceive, has an impact on the things we measure or want to talk
about, how can we ever be sure we are getting the ‘right’ measure-
ments? Further, without an agreed upon measurement, i.e. a shared
account of the world, how can we understand one another, let alone,
andmore importantly, act collectively? Another problem, which is not
an anti-realist one per se but is still relevant to the discussion at hand,
is how to make sense of responsibility given this fragmented, or even
23 Karen Barad, ‘Posthumanist Performativity: Toward anUnderstanding of HowMatter
Comes to Matter’, Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society, 28.3 (2003), pp.
801–31 (p. 815).
24 Ibid., pp. 816, 818, 819, 821, 822, and 828.
25 Haraway, ‘The Promises of Monsters’, p. 300.
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erased, subject. I suggest that part of the answer to this can be found in
Evelyn Fox Keller’s use of the psychodynamism of individuation.
Psychodynamism of Individuation
Keller points out that, as is illustrated by the biblical use of ‘know-
ing’, and contrary to Bacon’s infamous proposition that ‘knowledge is
power’, knowledge needs not only be about power but can instead also
have to do with connection. Keller argues that this second possibility
has been largely ignored.26 Furthermore, she argues that knowledge’s
relationship to power has been overblown to such an extent that dom-
ination metaphors permeate scientific writing and thinking.27 She
stresses that the relationship to nature is all too often expressed in
terms of scientists ‘attacking’ or ‘solving’ nature, or of ‘conquering’
her/it — implying that something about nature will, through the at-
tack, conquest, or discovery of a solution, disappear and make way for
the scientist’s vision and will.
In Keller’s opinion, this conception of knowledge resembles a
conception of objectivity in which the knowing subject, in order
to be objective, has to be detached from her object of study. This
(mis)conceptualization of objectivity is due, she argues, to a specific
(mis)conception of autonomy wherein there is a ‘tacit implication
[…] that autonomy canbebought only at the price of unrelatedness’.28
The shared ideal of un-relatedness in both autonomy and objectivity
has persuaded her to explore the interaction between emotional and
cognitive experiences and development. Not only does this shared
ideal suggest that the two are related, but Keller’s hypothesis is that her
study could help uncover the idea that they are, in fact, co-constitutive.
In order to explore this relation between objectivity and autonomy,
Keller turns to the object-relation theory of German psychoanalyst
Ernst Schachtel and his take on the ‘psychodynamism of individu-
ation’.
26 Evelyn Fox Keller, Reflections on Gender and Science (NewHaven, CT: Yale University
Press, 1995), pp. 115–16.
27 Ibid., p. 123.
28 Ibid., p. 72.
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In traditional Freudian psychoanalysis, the process of individu-
ation, i.e. ego formation, is thought of as the more or less tragic
consequence of a self-awareness, or the delineation between inner
and outer stimuli, that develops as a result of unfulfilled needs. Freud
writes:
An infant at the breast does not as yet distinguish his ego from
the external world as the source of the sensations flowing in
upon him. He gradually learns to do so, in response to various
promptings. He must be very strongly impressed by the fact
that some sources of excitation, which hewill later recognize as
his own bodily organs, can provide him with sensations at any
moment, whereas other sources evade him from time to time
—among themwhat he desires most of all, his mother’s breast
— and only reappear as a result of his screaming for help.29
That is, by realizing that hermother cannot and is not fulling her needs,
the child understands that she is not, in fact — and this is contrary to
what shemay have initially thought/felt—onewith hermother or the
world. This is a traumatic experience for the child who then realizes
that she must turn outward to satisfy unmet needs, and this towards
an external world over which she has little control. This initiation into
self-consciousness is condemned, for Freud, to a separation from the
mother/world because it destroys the symbiotic illusion. This makes
the child’s relationship to the world conflictual, but also de facto ori-
ented towards instrumentalization. Though Freud acknowledges that
this feeling of connectedness with the world (or symbiosis) may sub-
side in some adults, something he calls in this context the oceanic
feeling, he claims not to recognize it in himself and proceeds to link it
to some primitive pre-individuated ego.30 Because of this, the oceanic
feeling speaks to, for him, some (regressive) longing to (re)unite with
the world/mother.
Schachtel has a different understanding of that dynamic of indi-
viduation. For the latter, fulfilling unmet needs is one of two types
of interest the child can have for the world. According to Schachtel,
29 SigmundFreud,Civilization and itsDiscontents, inTheStandardEdition of theComplete
PsychologicalWorks of SigmundFreud, ed. by James Strachey, trans. byAngelaRichards,
24 vols (London: Hogarth Press and the Institute of Psycho-Analysis, 1953–74), xxi
(1961), pp. 57–145 (p. 67).
30 Ibid., pp. 64–65.
ÉMILIE FILION-DONATO 245
the child is first and foremost turned towards the world by a curiosity
and pleasure that exceeds biological necessities, i.e. there is an intrinsic
and independent joy brought about by merely discovering the world.
This joy is explained, in Schachtel’s view, by the satisfaction the child
experiences when she is connected to others and the world. Further,
since Schachtel doesn’t think of the dynamic of individuation as trau-
matic, the kindof uniting effort such as that sought out throughFreud’s
‘oceanic’ feeling can be positive and desirable.31 This is the case so
long as the transition from the symbiotic moment to the moment of
individuation is dynamic. For this dynamism to be possible at all the
child must have a secure sense of self, which Schachtel describes as
one that can tolerate both difference and continuity between self and
world. This in turn enables an attention for the world and its objects
that is not only vested with or contingent upon one’s needs and de-
sires.32 Schachtel calls this attention allocentric perception. He calls
the instrumentalizing perception which opposes allocentric percep-
tion ‘autocentric perception’.
Keller uses Schachtel’s developments on perception to discuss
what I alluded to earlier: a particular conception of autonomy and its
relationship with objectivity. Keller terms the traditional conception
of autonomy, i.e. one in which one sees oneself as separated from
and impermeable to the world, static autonomy. Keller adds, how-
ever, that the allocentric perception that I just mentioned allows for
another conception of autonomy, which she calls dynamic autonomy.
This autonomy requires that one trust her capacities and abandon the
delusion that she is fully self-sufficient, can act independently of the
world and others, or can avoid being acted upon. This will allow ‘for
that vital element of ambiguity at the interface between subject and
object’.33
The notions of objectivity corresponding to dynamic and static
autonomy are dynamic and static objectivity. ‘Dynamic objectivity
aims at a form of knowledge that grants to the world around us its
independent integrity but does so in a way that remains cognizant
31 Ernst Schachtel,Metamorphosis: On the Conflict of Human Development and the Psych-
ology of Creativity (New York: Routledge, 2001), p. 182.
32 Keller, Reflections on Gender and Science, p. 119.
33 Ibid., p. 84, my emphasis.
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of, indeed relies on, our connectivity with that world’.34 Keller com-
pares this sort of objectivity to empathy. Like empathy, then, dynamic
objectivity is an objectivity that mobilizes shared experiences and
emotions between the subject and object of knowledge.35 In static
objectivity, on the contrary, the understanding of the other can only
be attained by separating and fracturing the subject from her object of
knowledge, which involves dissociating the object from the subject so
that the latter can instrumentalize it.This leads to a type of knowledge
where difference is thought of in terms of frontiers and sharp edges. In
this paradigm of objectivity, perception becomes an ‘act of aggressive
violence in which the perceiver, like Procrustes with his hapless vic-
tims, cuts off those aspects of the object which he cannot use for his
purposes’.36
In sum, Keller’s vision of the subject is not, strictly speaking, a ‘de-
centring’ of the subject in the sense that it makes the subject disappear.
In fact, as we have just seen, Keller spends a significant amount of en-
ergy describing how a subject is formed, or individuated, and how that
impacts her relationship to the world and therefore also to knowledge.
My point is, however, that this dynamism of individuation—which at
one point accepts a certain degree of separation and at another unites
subject andobject— forces us to think of the frontiers between subject
and object as at least momentarily absent. This ‘decentring of the sub-
ject’ is the key, in my opinion, to answering the criticisms addressed to
New Materialism which I have mentioned above.
Longino’s Critique of the Psychodynamism of Individuation
Before addressing how the psychodynamismof individuation can help
to answer the criticism addressed to New Materialism, let us turn
to Longino’s own criticism of the psychodynamism of individuation.
Longino’s characterization of the psychodynamism of individuation
focuses on the aspect of the theory that attempts to show that ‘cog-
34 Ibid., p. 117.
35 Ibid., p. 116.
36 Schachtel,Metamorphosis, p. 171, quoted by Keller, Reflections on Gender and Science,
p. 120.
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nitive efforts have an ineluctably affective dimension’.37 From that
reading, therefore, she places Keller’s psychodynamism of individu-
ation alongside standpoint theory38 for both theories, in her opinion,
aim to highlight the subjective conditionality of descriptive claims by
emphasizing their ‘social and historical location’. Her criticism of both
theories is, therefore, that they ‘fail to explain how we are to decide or
to justify decisions between what seem to be conflicting claims’.39 In
other words, if subject X describes ‘Phenomenon A’ as ‘a’ and subject
Y describes ‘Phenomenon A’ as ‘b’, how are we to determine who is
right?
Though Longino writes that both theories fail at answering this
question, she also proposes that standpoint theory attempts to solve
it by ascribing more epistemic authority to one subject based on their
social and historical location. It is less clear how she thinks the psy-
chodynamism of individuation ascribes epistemic authority, but she
nevertheless criticizes it on the same grounds. For Longino, the ‘ana-
lytical task is not to determine which is epistemically most adequate.
Rather, the task is to understand how these complexly conditioned
subjectivities are expressed in action and belief.’40
This criticism resembles what we have seen earlier about the
‘threat of anti-realism’ directed at New Materialism. That is to say, that
standpoint theory, the psychodynamism of individuation, and New
Materialism all, to use Longino’s wording again, ‘fail to explain howwe
are to decide or to justify decisions between what seem to be conflict-
ing claims’. It is indeed conceivable that the accounts of a phenomenon
given by New Materialism would lead to different descriptive claims
about that phenomenon.These accounts may change according to the
apparatus involved. So how can Keller’s psychodynamism of individu-
ation help at all with the ‘anti-realist’ problemsNewMaterialism seems
to reiterate?
37 Longino, ‘Subjects, Power and Knowledge’, p. 108.
38 As a reminder, ‘standpoint theory’ argues that the subject of knowledge’s position
(be it their gender, ‘race’, socio-economic background, sexual orientation, mental and
physical ability, etc.) has an influence on the type and quality of knowledge produced.
39 Longino, ‘Subjects, Power and Knowledge’, p. 109.
40 Ibid.
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Relational Ontology
My hope is to have shown above that the psychodynamism of indi-
viduation, contrary to what Longino suggests, is not about lending
epistemic superiority to one subject, but instead about redefining the
epistemic subject altogether by redefining what could be called his or
her epistemic virtues — a topic I will discuss in a moment — and by
extending who/what counts as subject. This expansion of the subject
is something this theory shares with NewMaterialism and what I have
called here relational ontology. As for the redefinition of the subject’s
epistemic virtues, New Materialism already hints at the connection
between ontology, epistemology, and ethics, but does not really ex-
pand upon the topic of epistemic virtues.
I have already claimed that New Materialism and the psychody-
namism of individuation share a common shift in ontological terms.
Indeed, what New Materialism and, I argue, Keller, ask us to do is
to try to think of object and subject in terms of the relationship they
have with one another, and how these relationships are shaped by and
shape these entities, critters, or relata. In Keller, this shift in ontology
is captured by her discussion of the ‘vital element of ambiguity’41 and
of the continuity between the subject and object, which questions the
impermeability of both and highlights their inter/intra-dependence.
Whereas in Haraway and Barad, the subject is ‘heterogenous’, ‘noni-
somorphic’, and ‘partial’,42 these descriptors all point to an ontology
in which subject-object formation is not only co-constitutive, but in
which the relation and cosmological organization bears more weight
than its ‘individual’ components.Therefore, the subject is redefined as
an emerging pattern of difference, which ‘highlight[s], exhibit[s], and
make[s] evident the entangled structure of the changing and contin-
gent ontology of the world, including the ontology of knowing’.43
Furthermore, both, beyond offering a different ontology, propose
in and by this ontology, an ethical framework. The suggestion that the
self cannot be defined or thought of outside of its relationships has two
major ethical consequences. First, it allows for a much more dynamic
41 Keller, Reflections on Gender and Science, p. 84.
42 Haraway, ‘Situated Knowledges’, p. 586.
43 Barad,Meeting the Universe Halfway, p. 73.
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(and emancipating?) self-understanding. That is, one that is not con-
fined to only one or to a cumulative list of identity.This ‘departure from
identity’ is not, however, reducible to a non-identity, or a point of view
from nowhere, i.e. a detached conception of objectivity which aims to
paradoxically embody theuniversal.Thepositionality of every element
in the pattern of diffraction is andhas to be taken into account! But that
account, or census of positions, does not determine future outcomes,
nor does it sanction the attribution of blame. The causal chain of the
elements taken into account is neither linear nor monocausal, and it is
therefore neither reproducible nor predictable. Thus, identity is both
constrained by some parameters and, at the same time, understood as
contingent: it is processual.
Processualism and Allocentric Perception
I would now like to discuss processuality and return to the question
of how a reading of the psychodynamism of individuation may an-
swer some criticism addressed to New Materialism. Processuality is
precisely what helps reveal how the ‘complexly conditioned subjectiv-
ities’ Longinoworries about ‘are expressed in action andbelief ’. Keller’s
understanding of processuality involves ‘the growing interest among
physicists in a process description of reality’, whereby ‘object reality ac-
quires a dynamic character, akin to themorefluid concept of autonomy
emerging from psychoanalysis’.44 Indeed, where the psychodynamism
of individuation can benefit New Materialism, I argue, is precisely
through these processual, dynamic descriptions of the world that a
‘more fluid concept of autonomy’ allows for.
Therefore, and as a first response to this anxiety about the spectre
of anti-realism, the psychodynamism of individuation helps us to
understand how the agential cuts into phenomena are made at the hu-
man level.That is to say, according towhich interests, motivations, and
to what end those cuts are made. It emphasizes that knowledge claims
are not innocent anddevoid of emotional or libidinous investments (in
the terms ofNewMaterialism, these emotional-libidinous investments
may be considered part of the apparatus). It does not contend, how-
44 Keller, Reflections on Gender and Science, p. 94.
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ever, that these emotional investments are any ground to reject one
claim in favour of another (allegedly less invested) or to hierarchize
them into better or lesser claims. Instead, the psychodynamism of in-
dividuation calls for an investigation into these emotional-libidinous
investments — as real material objects — so that we can share fuller
accounts of phenomena.
Second, and while recognizing that this objective may not be
achievable (immediately or forever), the psychodynamism of indi-
viduation provides us with an insight into the problem of a shared
account of theworld. Indeed, with allocentric perception and dynamic
objectivity, a sketch of what Mirenda Fricker has called epistemic
virtues emerges.45 Though Fricker’s theory of epistemic virtues is of
inestimable help in the realm of judiciary testimonies as a transitional
or intermediate tool in this specific context, my point of departure or
premise is that, ultimately, for most knowledge projects, the sort of
unbiased judgement she is after is impossible, and may not even be
desirable.Therefore, in this quest for epistemic virtues, the orientation
would be towards those that result in the questioning of one’s own
authority and the roomthat is openedup as a consequence for different
and possibly conflicting accounts.These virtues, in common language,
might be called generosity, benevolence, patience, and curiosity —
though I am hesitant to propose anything that is definitive here, and
by giving these examples I only wish to make my meaning as clear as
possible. What I can say about these virtues at this point, however, is
that in practice they would be of the sort that maximize the possibility
for a common ground—evenwhen the language we use seems to lead
to deadlocks and contradictions regarding any phenomenon’s descrip-
tion.
The examples I have given may seem to put the onus of the epis-
temological enterprise on the ‘listener’ rather than the ‘speaker’ of
some information. I want to suggest, however, that the onus is in fact
shared between the parties. This is because one finds oneself in either
position at different times and also because these virtues, if we come
back to the examples of generosity, benevolence, patience, and curi-
45 Miranda Fricker, ‘The Virtue of Testimonial Justice’, in Epistemic Injustice: Power and
the Ethics of Knowing (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), pp. 86–108.
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osity, do not make a demand upon the ‘listener’ alone. Indeed, in the
way she conveys information a speaker can prove to be more or less
generous, benevolent, patient, and curious towards her interlocutor.
Keller alludes to this when she points to the empathy that dynamic
objectivity requires and which consists in finding a common language
in shared experiences and emotions.46 The psychodynamism of indi-
viduation therefore suggests that if non-instrumentalized perception is
possible, there is finally no such thing as a fully disinvested perception.
That is, this non-instrumentalized perception will have to find a com-
mon language in shared experiences and emotions which implies an
emotional investment. If we accept that perception is always-already
oriented and invested, what we need for finding a common ground
is a way of accessing multiple grids of analysis. I contend that this is
precisely what allocentric perception and dynamic objectivity offer.
Third, this encounter between New Materialism and the psycho-
dynamism of individuation has the advantage of addressing the threat
of idealism (understood as anti-realism) by encouraging doubt about
the ego’s separation from the world and also encouraging processual
reflexivity, which forces us to face the ways in which the ego affects
objects and how objects, in turn, affect the subject. Indeed, when the
subject enters this ambiguous space in which the object affects her
completely, there is as little doubt about the object’s presence as there
is about her own. Keller’s psychodynamism of individuation therefore
gives us the means to face and negotiate the ambiguity between the
inside and the outside without negating our sense of self.
Fourth, and regarding the question of accountability in the face
of a dislocated subject, I contend that agenthood, and hence account-
ability, in this ontological paradigm is not a matter of tracing back
intention and therefore responsibility to the original misbehaviour in
order to ‘punish the mistake’ of a ‘unified’, ‘coherent’, ‘free-acting’ sub-
ject. Rather, this accountability is one which encourages doubt about
one’s own presence as a coherent unit,47 and, by extension, encourages
doubt about one’s own (epistemological and ethical) omnipotence.
This accountability is one which demands that the subject locate her-
46 Keller, Reflections on Gender and Science, p. 116.
47 Haraway, ‘Situated Knowledges’, pp. 585–86.
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self in the maelstrom of forces pushing her around and thus that she
identify where her power lies. Further, this accountability is one that
demands ‘reponsibility for difference’, for where one places the fateful
line between self and everything else.48 This doubt results in what
Haraway calls the ‘possibility of webs of connections’, which are ‘called
solidarity in politics and shared conversations in epistemology’.49 This
alliance between New Materialism and the psychodynamism of in-
dividuation hence shifts the focus from a cartography of matter that
demands exhaustive models aimed at predicting future outcomes or
at attributing blame to one that dynamically demands responses (per-
sonal and collective) todepleting circumstances. In sum, howwearrive
where we are does matter (to get out of immobilizing blame and
shame), but it matters less than how we can fix/change the depleting
circumstances andmove forward collectively, whether that be through
reparations, mediation, or separation.
48 Ibid., p. 585.
49 Ibid., p. 584.
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